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CITY OF VERNON, .Appellant, v. CI'l'Y OF 
LOS ANGBLES. H('spondent. 
C.2rl 
Streets-Sewers-Actions-Judgment.-~In an action by the 
of Vernon the of Los for declaratory 
for of contracts for disposal of 
for negligence in Los 
Angeles' attempts to dispose of sewuge, a determination that 
it was decided in a prior abatement action by the state againBt 
both cities that Vernon had no rights against Los Angeles 
under the sewage disposal contracts was erroneous and con-
trary to the language of the District Court of Appeal in 
affirming the abatement injunction that the trial court cor-
rectly refrained from passing on any of the rights, obligations 
or liabilities affecting the cities by reason of their contractual 
relations with each other, and also contrary to the language 
of the Supreme Court pointing out that the prior decision 
required that the cities should settle or litigate their con-
tractual rights independently of compliance with the injunc-
tion decree. 
[2a, 2b] Id.- Sewers- Contracts- Impracticability of Perform-
ance.-In an action by the city of Vernon against the city of 
Los Angeles for specific performance of contracts for disposal 
of Vernon's sewage and for other relief, determinations by 
the trial court that a prior abatement action against both 
cities required Los Angeles to build a new screening plant 
and a tube at a cost of approximately $41,000,000, that the 
cost of operating and maintaining the new plant would be 
approximately $500,000 per annum, that Los Angeles could not 
continue performance under its contracts with Vernon except 
at excessive and unreasonable cost, and that it was not prac-
ticable for Los Angeles to continue performance under the 
terms of the contract with the use of the new plant and 
tube supported the position of Los Angeles that further 
performance under such contracts by it was excused, since 
the parties contemplated that there would be available for 
legal use disposal facilities, whether those in existence or to 
be constructed, the cost of which would not be disproportionate 
to the costs expressly referred to in such contTacts. 
[3] Contracts-Performance-Excuses for Nonperformance-Im-
possibility.-A contract is impossible of performance in legal 
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Contracts § 238 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 363. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] Streets, § 463; [2] Streets, 
§ 458; [3] Contracts, § 234. 
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when it is not when it can only 
be done at an excessive or unrensonable cost. 
[4] Streets-Sewers-Actions-Judgment.-In an action by the 
city of Vernon against the city of Los Angeles for specific 
performance of contracts for of Vernon's sewage 
and for other the effect of a that such con-
tracts were "terminated" and were was not to deter-
mine that when performance 
ticable the eontracts were 
what performance had already 
since such determination would be 
that certain described "facilities and created under 
the contracts could and should be where the judg-
ment expressly contemplated an adjustment of prior obliga-
tions. 
[5] Id.-Sewers-Actions-Remedies.-A cause of action by the 
city of Vernon against the city of Los Angeles for damages 
in the amount which Vernon was required to pay under a 
prior abatement judgment in return for its use of the Los 
Angeles disposal facilities, based on the theory that the negli-
gent failure of Los Angeles to perform its contractual duty 
to keep its sewage disposal facilities in good condition and 
carry away the sewage of Vernon was the proximate cause 
of the abatement judgment against Vern on, could not be 
maintained where performance of such duty was excused 
due to excessive and unreasonable expense. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William ,J. Palmer, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief, for specific 
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SCHAUER, J.-The city of Vernon by its complaint for 
declaratory relief and injunction seeks a determination that 
under contracts entered into between it and defendant city of 
Los Angeles in 1909, 1925, 1931, and 1938 it is entitled to dis-
charge a certain amount of its sc>vage through the sewer system 
of Los Angeles without payment to Los Angeles; Vern on also 
712 
tions that the contracts are 
required to finance its share 
posal facilities built Los 
decision for the state in 
without effect 
supra, 83 Cal 627 ; and 
the sewage of Los 
of the cost of new sewage dis-
in accordance with the 
Los Angeles (1948), 
Vernon has no right to use 
on payment of its 
share of the cost of the facilities used. 
After trial the superior court decreed that Vernon is not en-
titled to the relief sought; that the contracts between Vern on 
and Los Angeles (except for certain salvageable elements) are 
terminated and ''have been invalid and unenforceable sinct· 
a time not later than the entry of ... judgment in the State 
Abatement Action''; and that Vernon is entitled to use the 
new facilities only on payment of its share of their cost. 
Vern on has It contends that the decision of the 
superior court is based upon the erroneous determination that 
the decree in the abatement action (People v. City of Los 
Angeles (1948), supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]) 
decided against Vern on the issues raised in this action as to 
its contracts with Los \Ve have concluded that al-
though such determination of the trial court is erroneous, its 
judgment can and should be on the basis of its further 
determination that the performance of the contracts was ex-
cused and the contracts were because performance 
became impossible except at impractical, excessive, unreason-
able expense not contemplated by the parties when the con-
tracts were made. 
The Effect of the Abatement Decree 
The determination of the trial court in this action that the 
essential issues herein were finally decided against Vern on in 
the abatement action is a serious error which, as is hereinafter 
explained, involves an attempt to rewrite or disregard a sub-
stantial portion of a final judgment of the superior court and 
opinions of a District Court of Appeal and of this court. Al-
though this error dors not require reversal, discussion of it in 
connection with the background of this action will aid under-
standing of the present controversy. 
Dec. CITY VERNON t'. CITY OF l~os ANGELES 
[45 C.2d 710; 290 P.2d 841} 
Years ago c1t1es 
other than Los Angeles and sanitation districts in the Los 
Angeles area ·which subsequently became defendants in tbe 
abatement action found themselves unable to con 
struct sewage disposal faeilities. The of Los 
.c'tngeles had constructed an outfall sewer with a ca-
pacity which exceeded its then neNls. in 
1909 with V crnon, the cities other than lJos and tlH' 
sanitation districts made contracts with I~os by which 
I.;os Angeles agreed to dispose of their sevntge. "[T)he eon-
tracts between the city of r_.os Angeles and the other munici-
palities and sanitation districts under discussion were for an 
indefinite period, or, in some instances, for the life of the 
outfall sewer system itself, and in no instance carried any 
provision permitting the contracts to be cancelled when or if 
the city of Los Angeles required the use of that of the 
capacity of its outfall sewer system covered by the above-
mentioned contracts" (p. 631 of 83 Cal.App.2d). 
Sewage was originally disposed of by Los Angeles under 
its 1909 contract with Vernon by transporting it through an 
outfall sewer to Hypcrion and diseharging it raw into Santa 
Monica Bay about 900 fe0t oft'shore. In HJ22, pursuant to 
requirements of the State Departmmt of Public Health, Los 
Angeles commenced construction of new facilities, induding 
a screening plant and a submarine tube extending about a 
mile offshore at Hyperion. These faciliti<'s wf'l'e operated 
under a permit issued to Los Angeles in 1923. 
In 1940, because r_.os Angeles had violated the terms of the 
1923 permit and created a nuisance, the state suspended the 
permit; however, it granted a temporary permit on condition 
that IJOS Angelrs at once prepare plans for the construction 
and financing of adequate sewage works. Los An-
geles did not comply with the terms of the temporary permit 
and the state revoked such permit. It also revoked permits 
of other defendants, including Vernon. Thus all rights of the 
contracting partiPS to dispose of sewage throu§!h +hp existing 
facilities were terminated. 
In 1943 the state brought the abatement action. Judgment 
for the state was entered on ll'ebruary 1, 1946, and afi1rmcd 
in People v. City of Los Angeles (1948), supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 
627. This court denied a hearing, and th~ Unitrd Statrs 
Supreme Court denied certiorari (335 U.S. 852 [69 S.Ct. 80, 
93 L.Ed. 400]). 
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Both before and after the institution of the abatement action 
Los .Angeles attempted to work out means, alone or in coopera-
tion with the other cities, whereby the sewage could be ade-
quately disposed of by methods conforming with health and 
safety laws. Vernon did not make similar efforts; it sat by, 
resting on its claim that all its responsibility for disposition of 
its sewage, including its responsibility to the People of the 
State of California, had been assumed by Los .Angeles. 
Through the years the pressing need for continued and im-
proved disposition of sewage increased with the increase of 
the volume of sewage originating in the cities which used the 
Los .Angeles facilities, including, as found by the trial court, 
''the enormous increase in volume of sewage originating in the 
City of Vern on as a result of the greatly increased industrial 
activity within its boundaries." 
.After certiorari to review the abatement injunction was 
denied, Vernon, having elected to use the Los .Angeles system, 
did not, as required by the injunction, report what steps it 
had taken to comply with the portion of the injunction which 
required it to arrange to finance its share of the cost of the 
new plant; instead, it reported its reasons for having taken no 
steps to comply with that portion of the injunction. It claimed 
that it was unable to understand the decree, although other 
cities had been able to understand and comply with its terms. 
In the abatement action the trial court determined that Los 
.Angeles had plans for an acceptable new plant to be built at 
Hyperion; that it would be to the best interests of all defend-
ants to dispose of their sewage through such new plant al-
though it would be possible for some of the defendants other 
than Los .Angeles, including Vernon, to make arrangements at 
great expense to dispose of their sewage without using the 
facilities of Los .Angeles. The judgment ordered that Los 
.Angeles build a new plant of sufficient capacity to abate the 
nuisance; that each other defendant either provide its own 
facilities for disposing of its sewage in a safe and sanitary 
manner or arrange to finance its share of the cost of the new 
plant proportionate to gallonage allotted to it; that such other 
defendants notify the court of the manner in which they 
elected to comply with the abatement injunction. The decree 
provided for continuing supervision by the court. Vernon 
elected to dispose of its sewage through the new facilities to be 
built by Los .Angeles but did not make arrangements to finance 
its share of the cost of such facilities until it was compelled 
to do so by contempt proceedings (see City of Vernon v. St~­
perior Court (1952), 38 Ca1.2d 509 [241 P.2d 243] ). 
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As previously indicated, in the action defendant Los 
Angeles takes the position and the trial court determined that 
it had been decided in the abatement action that Vernon has 
no rights against I-'os Angeles under the sewage disposal con-
tracts which are the subject of the present action. The answer 
filed by Vernon in the abatement action denied the allegations 
Vernon of the state's complaint, set forth the contracts 
of 1909, 1925, 1931, and 1938 with Los Angeles, and alleged 
Vernon's position that under the contracts Los Angeles agreed 
to keep its sewer system in good condition; that upon delivery 
of Vernon sewage into the I.1os Angeles system Los Angeles 
had sole responsibility for its sanitary disposal; that Los 
Angeles alone was responsible for the nuisance and for the 
construction at its sole expense of facilities to abate it. 
[1] 'rhe superior court in its findings of fact in the present 
action purports to determine ''that the issues created by the de-
nials and affirmative allegations set forth in the answer of the 
City of Vernon [in the abatement case] were unavoidably and 
unequivocally before the court in said case . . . and by the 
judgment entered in that case, were judicially determined 
by the court against the City of Vern on.'' The relevant facts 
are, however, that at the trial of the abatement action the 
court refused to admit the contracts between Vernon and Los 
Angeles in evidence, and the findings and judgment in the 
abatement action did not refer to the particular issues there 
and here raised by Vernon as to its rights under the contracts. 
The conclusions of law in the abatement action contained the 
following statements which relate to the contracts: Each city 
has the primary duty to dispose of its sewage in a safe and 
sanitary manner; none of the defendants is released from such 
duty by any permission or right created by contract, ordi-
nance, or otherwise; ''regardless of past relationships or con-
tractual or other rights, privileges or obligations between the 
various defendants," the state is entitled to an injunction re-
straining defendants from maintaining sewage works without 
a permit and from discharging sewage into the bay in a man-i 
ner which would create a nuisance. 
It is apparent from the findings, conclusions, and judgment 
in the abatement action that the trial court there decided that 
Vern on's contracts with I.Jos Angeles were no defense in that 
action but that it did not purport to decide what contractual 
rights Vernon might have against I.1os Angeles apart from the 
abatement action. On the appeal of Vernon and others in the 
abatement action the District Court of Appeal made it clear 
that such was the effect of the abatement injunction so far as 
716 [45 C.2d 
were concerned. It 
, "the court rightfully re-
frained from ""'"'"'-'"' upon any of the rights, obligations or 
liabilities the various defendants by reason of their 
cow'""'n" with each other, and left those matters 
open for future adjudication in a proper proceeding. Al-
though the aforesaid contracts concerned the disposal of 
sewage, the court would not be justified in this action to 
adjudicate the rights existing between the various appellants 
by reason of their contracts one with the other. Insofar as 
the judgment herein is concerned, if any of the appellants 
have any rights against the city of Los Angeles, or vice versa, 
by reason of any existing contract, such rights have been pre-
served and may be enforced in a proper action.'' 
After the affirmance of the abatement injunction and the 
denial of a hearing and of certiorari, Vernon instituted the 
present action. It did not take steps, by levy of taxes or issu-
ance of bonds or imposition of charges, to raise funds for pay-
ment of its share of the cost of the new sewage plant, and it 
was found guilty of contempt for failing to comply with the 
abatement injunction. It sought review of the contempt 
judgment, contending, among other things, that bringing the 
present action was compliance with the injunction. This 
court rejected that contention and affirmed the contempt 
judgment. (City of Vernon v. Superior Court (1952), supra, 
38 Cal.2d 509, 518.) We said, "The obvious purpose of the 
injunction was to get the nuisance promptly abated and to 
that end to get the new plant built and paid for without the 
delay attendant on independent or later ensuing litigation to 
determine the validity and effect of the old contracts of Vernon 
and other corporate defendants." This court then quoted the> 
language of the District Court of Appeal which is quoted in 
the preceding paragraph and said of that language and of 
the superior court ruling there under discussion, ''This ruling 
preserves to petitioners all contractual rights they may possess 
under the mentioned contracts but likewise it requires them 
to settle or litigate those rights independently of compliance 
with the injunction decree" (p. 519 of 38 CaL2d). 
It therefore appears that the determination of the trial 
court in the present action that the abatement injunction de-
cided adversely to Vernon the questions of its contractual 
rights against Los Angeles is erroneous and contrary to the 
clear language of the District Court of Appeal in affirming 
the injunction and of this court in upholding the determina-
tion that Vernon was in contempt. 
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As a further ground of decision the trial court determined 
that there was available to Los Angeles the defense of impossi-
bility-not literal impossibility, but due to 
excessive and unreasonable Land 
Co. v. Howard (1916), 172 L.R.A. 
1916F 1] Rest., Contracts, § 454. For the reasons hereinafter 
stated, we conclude that this determination of the trial court 
is tenable. 
Pursuant to the 1909 agreement Los Angeles built within 
Vernon and connected to the Los Angeles disposal system a 
main sewer and a lateral sewer for the joint use of the two 
cities. By that contract Los Angeles agrees to operate and 
maintain the joint sewers and Vern on agrees to pay 5 per 
cent of the cost of operation and maintenance. Each city 
agrees to operate and maintain its own sewer system at its 
own expense, ''other than those portions which are constructed 
and used by them jointly. . . . [I]n consideration of the con-
struction of the [joint] sewers above named, by the City of 
Los Angeles at its own cost and expense, and of the connection 
of said sewers with the outfall sewer also constructed by the 
said City of Los Angeles [for discharge of sewage into the 
bay] and of the privilege of connecting the sewer system to be 
constructed hereafter by the said City of Vern on with said 
sewers, and of discharging the sewage of said City of Vern on 
with said sewers," Vernon shall pay Los Angeles 50 per cent 
of the cost of the main sewer, not to exceed $12,000, and 
20 per cent of the cost of the lateral sewer, not to exceed 
$1,300. The agreement contains no provision as to its termina-
tion. 
As previously stated (ante, p. 713), pursuant to a state 
permit issued in 1923, Los Angeles built a screening plant 
and submarine tube at Hyperion. These facilities were used 
in performance of the 1909 contract. 
By the 1925 contract Vernon agrees in its use of sewers to 
abide by the rules which Los Angeles prescribes for the use of 
its sewers. 
The 1931 agreement (which was never carried out but rather 
became the subject of much controversy between the parties) 
provides that Vernon shall be permitted to discharge not 
more than 11.7 cubic feet of sewage per second1 into the Los 
Angeles sewer system pursuant to the 1909 contract; for this 
1The amount of sewage discharged by Vernon has always been and 
now is less that 11.7 cubic feet per second. 
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right Vernon is not required to pay anything; upon the execu-
tion of the agreement Vernon shall pay $234,220 for the right 
to discharge additional amounts of sewage in excess of 11.7 
cubic feet per second and $36,200 as its share of the cost of 
construction by Los Angeles in Vern on of a relief sewer; for 
sewage in excess of 11.7 cubic feet per second Vernon shall pay 
Los A.ngeles such proportion of the annual cost of operation, 
maintenance, replacement, and repair of the sewage disposal 
facilities of Los Angeles used by Vernon as the additional 
quantity of sewage discharged by Vern on bears to the total 
amount of sewage discharged through the T_jos Angrles system. 
·'Los Angeles shall operate, maintain and keep in good condi-
tion and repair said sewage system, outfall sewers, treatment 
nlant and ocean outlet therefrom for the term of this agree-
ment.'' The term of the agreement shall be the life of the 
North Outfall Sewer. (As indicated above, Los Angeles had 
completed construction of this sewer in 1924; its permit to 
use this sewer was suspended in 1940 and revoked in 1943.) 
Vernon did not perform its promises to pay $234,220 and 
$36,200 under the 1931 agreement. In 1937 Los Angeles 
filed two actions against Vernon, one for payments under the 
1931 agreement and one for an injunction against discharging 
;;;ewage into the Los Angeles system. 
The 1938 agreement 'ltates that Los Angeles and Vern on 
desire to settle all controversies as to the prior agreements and 
to provide for future operation and maintenance of sewage 
dispo~al facilities. The right of Vernon to dispose of 11.7 
cubic feet of sewage per second through the Los Angeles 
outfall sewers is acknowledged. Los Angeles agrees to sell 
and Vernon agrees to buy the right to dispose of an additional 
4.3 cubic feet per second; for this right to dispose of additional 
sewage Vernon agrees to pay $112,885.45 by April 1, 1939, to-
g·ether with specified annual payments. until 1965, totaling 
$135,356.60; "in lieu of such annual payments, Vernon may 
. pay the then current worth of unpaid future annual pay-
ments, discounted at the rate of 3% per annum compounded 
annually.'' Vern on further agrees that if it exercises its right 
to dispose of sewage in excess of 11.7 cubic feet per second, it 
will pay its proportionate share, measured by the ratio of its 
sewage in excess of 11.7 cubic feet per second to the total flow 
of sewage through the Los Angeles outfall sewers and treat-
ment plant, of the cost to Los Angeles of operation, repair. 
replacement, construction and reconstruction of the I.~os An. 
geles outfall sewers and treatment plant. The contract pro-
vides for dismissal of the 1907 actions instituted by r~os An-
Dec. CITY OF VERNON v. CrrY o.F Los ANGELES 
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geles. 'fhere are additional provisions as to gauging stations, 
a relief sewer, and other matters which need not be set out. 
'l'he agreement contains no provision as to its termination. 
Vernon made the $112,885.45 payment provided for by the 
1938 contr&ct after it was due, with interest to compensate for 
the delay; it prepaid the annual payments as the contract 
provided it might do; IJOS Angeles accepted the payments in 
of the obligations for which they were tendered. 
[2a] 'l'he trial court in the present action determined that 
pursuant to the abatement injunction the lawful existence of 
the screening plant and the tube built pursuant to the 1923 
permit has expired; that Los Angeles is required to build a 
new plant and tube at a cost of approximately $41,000,000; 
that the cost of operating and maintaining the new plant and 
tube will be approximately $500,000 per annum; that Los An-
geles cannot continue performance under its contracts with 
Vernon ''except at an excessive and unreasonable cost; that it 
is not practicable for the City of Los Angeles to continue the 
performance under the terms of the contracts ... with the use 
of the new ... plant and ... tube." 
The trial court in the present action further determined 
''That it was not intended by the plaintiff and defendant 
herein that the City of Los Angeles was obligating itself, under 
the terms ... of the contracts heretofore entered into between 
said parties, to build ... and operate large and extensive facili-
ties or treatment works for the purification of sewage . . . ; 
that neither nor all [sic] of said contracts provide for, nor 
was it contemplated by either of the parties hereto in entering 
into said contracts, that the City of Los Angeles was or would 
be required under said contracts to erect ... and operate a 
... treatment plant costing approximately $41,000,000 for the 
treatment of sewage arising within the boundaries of the City 
of Vern on. " 
The foregoing determinations of the trial court support the 
position of Los Angeles, succinctly stated in its brief, that 
"since further use of the facilities contemplated by the parties 
would be unlawful and the nse of new facilities (ordered by 
the Court [in the abatement action]) would be unreasonably 
excessive in cost, further performance under said contracts by 
Los Angeles is excused.'' 
[3] The controlling principles as to legal impossibility ex-
cusing performace have been long recognized in this state and 
are stated in JJ1incral Park Lancl Co. v. Howard (1916), supra, 
172 Cal. 289, 293, where defendants contracted to take gravel 
720 v. CrrY OF' Los ANGELES [45 C.2d 
from at a certain price, and it was subse-
quently found that the present, could be taken 
only at prohibitive " 'A is impossible in legal 
contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is im-
practicable when it can be done at an excessive and un-
reasonable cost.' Beach on Contracts, § 216.) We do not 
mean to intimate that the defendants could excuse themselves 
by showing the existence of conditions which would make the 
performance of their obligation more expensive than they had 
anticipated, or which would entail a loss upon them. But 
where the difference in cost is so great as here, and has the 
<'ffect, as found, of making performance impracticable, the 
situation is not different from that of a total absence of earth 
and gravel." 
[2b] As we understand the composite contracts of the 
parties, and as is implicit in the trial court's findings, the 
parties contemplated that there would be available for legal 
use disposal facilities. whether those in existence or to be 
constructed, the cost of which would not be completely dis-
proportionate to the costs expressly referred to in those con-
tracts. Therefore, the case is not like the cases relied upon by 
Vernon where it was held that unforeseen hardship or unex-
pected expense did not excuse performance. (Western Indus-
tries Co. v. }Jason 111. etc. Co. (1922), 56 Cal.App. 355, 360 
[205 P. 466]; Orr v. Forde (1929), 101 Cal.App. 694, 702 
[282 P. 429]; see also Lloyd v. J!t~rphy (1944), 25 Cal.2d 48, 
55 [153 P.2d 47] ["laws or other governmental acts that make 
performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive do not 
excuse the duty to perform a contractual obligation''].) 
Vern on points to undisputed evidence that both be-
fore and after the parties entered into the 1938 contract offi-
eials of Los Angeles were concerned with and attempting to 
arrange for and construction of new sewage disposal 
facilities; such evidence. it says, shows that Los Angeles at 
the time of the making of the contract recognized and assumed 
the risk of the possibility that it would have to build expensive 
new facilities. Such a conclusional finding is not impelled as 
a matter of law. It is reasonable to believe that what was in 
the contemplation of the parties when they negotiated the 1938 
contract wa.s not the radical development of the 1943 abate-
ment action but the working out of past and then existing 
difficulties without expense running into many millions. 
Vernon asserts that ''Plaintiff is entitled to an answer to the 
questions: 'If the contracts are invalid, when were they in-
valid? By what manner did they become invalid?' These are 
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the issues raised by the complaint and the answer-material 
issues-and should be answered one way or the other." The 
findings, conclusions, and judgment herein sufficiently resolve 
these ''issues'' by the determination that conditions were such. 
by the time the abatement judgment was entered, that per-
formance of the contracts had become impracticable. 
[4] Despite the language that the contracts are "termi-
nated'' and ''invalid,'' the effect of the judgment herein is not 
to determine that when performance by one party became im-
practicable the contracts were altogether abrogated regardless 
of what performances had already been rendered by either 
party. Such a determination would be incorrect. (See Ogren 
v. Inner Harbor Land Co. (1927), 83 Cal.App. 197, 199 [256 
P. 607].) More accurately, the judgment determines that 
certain described "facilities and rights" created under the 
contracts (such as the gauging stations and relief sewer 
provided for by the 1938 contract) can and should be salvaged, 
and although the case was not tried in such a way that all obli-
gations between the parties could be precisely adjusted by the 
judgment herein, such judgment expressly contemplates an 
adjustment of those obligations; it decrees that Vernon is 
liable to Los Angeles for any monetary oblig·ations accrued 
under the contracts prior to the entry of judgment in the 
abatement action,2 "provided, however, that if all the benefits 
received by her from the City of Los Angeles under all said 
agreements prior to the entry of said judgment in said State 
Abatement Action have had a fair value less than the total 
payments made by her and those now owing to the City of Los 
Angeles, she, Vern on, shall be credited with such excess of 
payments over such value of benefits received.' '3 
'As stated, ante, p. 719, Vernon made and Los Angeles accepted pay-
ments which discharged the two principal monetary obligations under 
the 1938 contract. Wl1ether Vernon made all other, lesser payments for 
various facilities and rights under such contract cannot be determined 
from the record herein. 
"Concerning the subject of this declaration the trial court made the 
following statement in ' memorandum opinion; 
"The case [for declaratory relief] was not tried by either side on a 
theory that required presentation of evidence which would have enabled 
the court to make a financial adjustment between the parties. Hence, 
the court presently ran only suggest a program that seems to be just, 
doing so with the understanding that the parties are free to work out 
an amicable adjustment at variance with the court's suggestions. In 
any such adjustment Vernon, it seems, should be charged with all pay-
ments accrued under the composite agreement up to the entry of judg-
ment in the State A hatcment Action, and, if up to that time the henefits 
received by her under the agreements had a fair value less than the 
total cost to her, she should be credited with the difference." 
722 CITY oF VER:-JON v. CITY m' Los ANGELES [45 C.2d 
Other Contentions 
Vern on urges that the contracts were validated by the 
Municipal Sewer District Act of 1939 (Stats. 1939, ch. 24; 
Deering's Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 5192a). Section 4 of that 
act provided, ''All contracts made prior to the adoption and 
passage of this act between any two or more municipal cor-
porations . . . providing for the joint construction, use or 
operation of sewer systems, or sewage disposal are 
hereby ratified and confirmed . . . '' Since further perform-
ance of the contracts is excused because of conditions which 
arose subsequent to the 1939 act, we need not discuss the effect 
of that act or of other, previous laws as to sewage disposal 
contracts which are cited by Vernon. 
[5] Vernon's second cause of action is for damages in 
the amount which it is required to pay under the abate-
ment judgment in return for its use of the Los Angeles 
disposal facilities. This cause of action is based on the theory 
that the negligent failure of Los Angeles to perform its con-
tractual duty to keep its sewage disposal facilities in good 
condition and carry away the sewage of Vernon was the 
proximate cause of the abatement judgment against Vern on. 
Since performance of such duty was excused, the cause of 
action cannot be maintained. 
Vern on asserts that the trial court's adjudication that it 
is not entitled to specific performance may be based upon 
determinations, which Vern on claims are erroneous, that it 
suffered no detriment commensurate with the benefits granted 
it under the contracts and that the consideration paid by 
it was disproportionately small as compared with the value 
of the obligations assumed by Los Angeles. The determination 
that further performance is excused is independent of deter-
minations as to adequacy of consideration, and the latter 
subject need not be discussed. 
In its petition for hearing by this court after decision 
of the District Court of Appeal Vernon asserted for the 
first time that the judgment of the trial court, if it is affirmed, 
will deprive Vernon of property without due process of law. 
This contention is but a variant of the argument, hereinbefore 
discussed and rejected, that since the making of the contracts 
there have been no developments which can excuse their 
further performance. 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tern.,* concurred. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
CrTY oF VERNON v. CITY oP Los ANGEIJES 
[45 C.2d 710; 290 P.2d 841] 
728 
I agree the opinion that the trial court erred 
in concluding that the decree in the abatement action deter-
mined the issues raised in this action. I am further con-
that the trial court erred also in concluding 
is excused from performing its contractual 
of impossibility. 
so well established that it requires 
that the mere fact that per-
formance of a promise is made more difficult and expensive 
than the anticipated when the contract was made, 
will not excuse the promisor from his obligation to perform 
his part of the contract. (Metzler v. Thye, 163 Cal. 95 [124 
P. 721] ; Cottlter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal.App. 
480 [10 P.2d 780]; Williston on C•mlracts (rev. eel.), vol. 6, 
~ 1963; Rest., Contracts, § 467.) "Parties should be careful 
about making contracts, for once made the courts will not 
relieve them for light or trivial reasons. Pnblic policy is 
subservecl by leaving the parties and their rights to be meas-
ured by the terms of their engagements. (California Cured 
F'ruit Assn. v. Stelling, 141 Cal. 713 [75 P. 320].) They 
may have made an unfortunate arrangement, but when they 
have entered into it voluntarily, they are bound by it in the 
absence of equitable grounds for avoidance. (Cook v. Snyder, 
16 Ca1.App.2cl 587 [61 P.2cl 53].) They must be presumed 
to have contracted with reference to existing conditions known 
to them. (Dore v. Southern Pac. Co., 163 Cal. 182 [124 P. 
817].) A person contracting with eyes open and aware of 
the facts is presumed to undertake performance at the risk 
of interference from agencies not expressly provided against. 
(McCulloch v. Lignori, 88 Cal.App.2d 366 [199 P.2d 25] .) 
Moreover, contracting parties cannot escape performance of 
their undertakings because of unforeseen hardship. (Metzler 
v. 1'hyc, 163 Cal. 95 [124 P. 721] .) " (12 Ca1.Jur.2cl, Con-
tracts, § 226.) Applied to factual situations analogous to 
that presented here, the rule has been stated that laws or 
other governmental acts that make performance unprofitable 
or more difficult or expensive do not excuse the duty to per-
form a contractual obligation (Aristocrat Highway Displays 
v. Stricklen, 68 Cal.App.2d 788 [157 P.2cl 880] ; Western 
Ind1£Stn.es Co. v. Mason Jill. etc. Co., 56 Cal.App. 355 [205 
P. 466] ; McCulloch v. Liguori, 88 Cal.App.2d 366 [199 P.2cl 
25] ; Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Ca1.2cl 48 [153 P.2cl 47]; Sample 
v. F'resno Flume etc. Co., 129 CaL 222 [61 P. 1085] ; Klauber 
v. San Diego Street Car Co., 95 Cal. 353 [30 P. 555] ). 
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Looking at the present factual situation, we note that a 
governmental act-the abatement action-has caused Los An-
geles to make certain expenditures, and has made performance 
by Los Angeles of its contractual obligations more expensive. 
Applying the general rule to this factual situation, we would 
conclude that Los Angeles is not excused from performing its 
contractual obligations, and that Los Angeles therefore has 
no right to retain all of the payment made by Vernon under 
court order to help finance the construction of a facility 
whereby Los Angeles may legally perform its contractual 
obligation. 
The rule has developed in modern times that supervening 
impossibility will, in proper cases, excuse a promisor's failure 
to perform. Unusual or unexpected expense does not estab-
lish impossibility of performance. (Metzler v. Thye, 163 Cal. 
95 [124 P. 721] ; Glens Falls Indern. Co. v. Perscallo, 96 
Cal.App.2d 799 [216 P.2d 567].) Failure to perform may 
be excused, howeycr, when the added cost is so great as to 
have the effect of making performance impracticable. In 
legal contemplation a thing is impossible when not practicable, 
and a thing is impracticable when it can be done only at an 
excessive and unreasonable cost (Mineral Park Land Co. v. 
Howard, 172 Cal. 289 [156 P. 458, L.R.A. 1916F 1]). 
The following characteristics should be particularly noted 
in regard to this defense of legal impossibility: First, it 
operates to excuse a nonperforming obligor from liability 
for his failure to perform. Second, it operates only when 
performance of the obligor's part of the contract is imprac-
ticable. Third, the unanticipated expense which will render 
performance impracticable must be very much greater (in 
the Mineral Park case it was 10 or 12 times greater) than 
the expected or usual cost of performance. With these 
characteristics in mind, it is evident that the majority opinion 
has erred in supporting the trial court's judgment on the 
basis of legal impossibility. 
Among the contractual obligations of Los Angeles, which 
the majority opinion says are excused, is a duty to accept 
at designated places, and to dispose of a specified quantity 
(up to 16 cubic feet per second) of sewage from Vernon. 
It should be noted that this duty was performed by Los 
Angeles up until the time of commencement of this action; 
it is presumably being performed by Los Angeles while this 
ease is pending in the courts; and it will assuredly be per-
formed in the future, after a decision is rendered in this case. 
It is obvious, then, that the doctrine of legal impossibility 
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as here applied by the majority does not excuse an obligor 
from liability for failure to perform a contractual duty; 
instead that doctrine is employed by the majority to rewrite 
the contract between these parties. r,os Angeles will continue 
to perform the services which it undertook to perform by this 
eon tract; Vern on will continue to dispose of its sewage at 
on the I1os Angeles outfall sewer; but 
Vernon, the obligee, will be required to pay more money, 
now and in the future, for this continuation of performance 
of the contractual obligations of Los Angeles. 
I am aware of no prior decision of this or any other court 
in which the doctrine of legal impossibility has been applied 
to increase the consideration to be paid by the promisee 
while recognizing that the promisor will continue to perform 
as before. By the same token, I can fiud neither law nor 
logic to support a decision which terms "impracticable" or 
"impossible" of performance, a contract which both parties 
and this court recognize as having been performed and is 
expected to be performed for an indefinite period in the 
future. This situation comes as near approaching a legal 
paradox as any which has come under my observation. 
As an additional matter, careful examination of the record 
in this case raises a question as to whether the cost of per-
forming the contract, using the new facilities, is substantially 
disproportionate to the anticipated cost of performance. The 
majority opinion refers to certain payments made by Vernon 
to Los Angeles. The total sum which Vern on had paid up 
to the time of trial for the use of the facilities of the Los 
Angeles sewer system was $296,801.50, in addition to the 
granting of flowage rights through Vernon. The majority 
opinion then refers to the trial court's finding that Los An-
geles is required to build a new treatment plant and tube 
at a cost of about $41,000,000, and that operation and main-
tenance of these facilities will cost about $500,000 per year. 
But these figures, juxtaposed in the majority opinion, are 
misleading. The figures "$41.000,000" and "$500,000" have 
but slight bearing on the cost to Los Angeles of performing 
its contractual obligation to Vernon. 
If this were a proper case for application of the doctrine 
of legal impossibility (if Vernon were seeking damages for 
a refusal by Los Angeles to accept any sewage from Vern on), 
the figure which would be computed to determine whether 
performance was unreasonably or excessively expensive would 
be the increased cost of performing this contract. Presumably 
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the cost of performance before the advent of the abatemen· 
action was not disproportionate to the 
consideration paid by Vernon. To compute the increase 111 
cost, one must recognize the additional facts that Los 
is building a sewage disposal plant with for 
million gallons per day; that 10 million 
this capacity is allotted to Vernon. If the 
and constructed without allotment of 
it would still have capacity for 250 million 
The increased cost of performing the contract is the differ-
ence in cost of construction between a 260-million-gallon 
per day plant and a 250-million-gallon per day plant. What 
this difference would be is impossible to determine from the 
record before us. It requires no engineer, however, to deduce 
that the cost of construction would not increase in direct 
proportion to the increase in capacity; the structural differ-
ences between a 250-million-gallon per day plant and a 260-
million-gallon per day plant would presumably be slight. 
It is clear, at any rate, that the increase in cost attributable 
to making the plant large enough to take care of Vern on's 
sewage, and thus the increased cost of performing the Vernon 
sewage contract, would not be 10 or 12 times as great as the 
approximately $300,000 which it would have cost to perform 
the contract if the abatement action had not intervened. 
Another point on which I am convinced the majority 
opinion is in error relates to V rrnon 's second cause of action, 
on the theory of negligence. The majority opinion states: 
''Vern on's second cause of action is for damages in the amount 
which it is required to pay under the abatement judgment 
in return for its use of the Los Angeles disposal facilities. 
This cause of action is based on the theory that the negligent 
failure of Los Angeles to perform its contractual duty to 
keep its sewage disposal facilities in good condition and carry 
away the sewage of Vern on was the proximate cause of the 
abatement judgment against Vernon. Since performance of 
such duty was excused, the cause of action cannot be main-
tained." (Emphasis added.) 
On this point the majority opinion appears to be incon-
sistent with itself. It is beyond dispute that a negligence 
action may be predicatrd on the breach of a duty arising 
out of contract. (L. B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 
Cal.2d 56 [244 P.2d 385].) If the brPaeh which causes the 
damage and gives rise to the cause of action occurs while 
the contractual duty is subsisting, can plaintiff's right to 
maintain a cause of action for that breach be destroyed by 
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he later occurrence of events v;hich are held to excuse the 
of the not. 
of the majority opinion is that Los An-
, performance of duties under the contracts is excused 
because of excessiye or unreasonable expense occasioned by 
the decree in the abatement action. But Vernon seeks relief 
by way of damages for the negligent operation of 
the sewage disposal facilities which brought about the abate-
ment action. In other words, Vernon alleges a breach of 
eontractual duties by Los Angeles before the existence of 
the conditions which are held in the majority opinion to 
excuse performance of those duties. Clearly the breach of 
duty alleged by Vernon in its second cause of action is a 
sufficient basis for maintenance of that cause of action even 
if the majority opinion were correct in holding the duty 
to be later excused. In other words, it was a breach of duty 
0n the part of Los Angeles which brought about the condition 
on which itR defense of impoRsibility of performance is predi-
cated. 
The pleadings relating to the second cause of action raised 
the issues (1) whether Los Angeles owed a contractual duty 
to maintain the old treatment plan and ocean outlet in good 
repair; (2) whether Los Angeles breached that duty by negli-
gence, carelessness and mismanagement in the operation and 
maintenance of the treatment plant and ocean outlet; and 
( 3) whether such breach, if any, was the direct and proximate 
cause of damage to Vern on. Much of the testimony in the 
trial court related to these issues. The failure of the trial 
court to make direct findings on these issues was prejudicial 
error. (Baggs v. Smith, 53 Cal. 88; Taylor v. Taylor, 192 
Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074]; Strong v. Strong, 22 
Cal.2d 540 [140 P.2d 386] ; Elliott v. Bertsch, 59 Cal.App.2d 
543 [139 P.2d 332] ; Mayer v. Beondo, 83 Cal.App.2d 665 
[189 P.2d 327, 190 P.2d 23]; Chamberlain v. Abeles, 88 Cal. 
App.2d 291 [198 P.2d 927]; Flennaugh v. Heinrich, 89 
Cal.App.2d 214 r200 P.2d 580] .) 
The trial court's finding of fact relative to the second cause 
of action reads as follows: "Insofar as the allegations of 
paragraphs III, IV, V and VI of said second cause of 
action purport to assert any present obligation of the City of 
l;os Angeles, or any present right of the City of Vernon, 
arising from any or all of the aforesaid contracts andjor 
from any conduct on the part of the City of Los Angeles, 
each of said allegations is untrue. It is not true that any 
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negligence andjor carelessness or other conduct of the de-
fendant was the proximate cause of the judgment entered 
against Vernon in said State Abatement Action, or of the 
order of the court which, in effect, required Vernon to pay 
the sum of $901,250.00 or any other sum as its proportionate 
share of the new treatment plant and/or submarine outfall 
andjor any other facility for sewage disposal, which said 
judgment required the City of Los Angeles to construct; 
and it is not true that plaintiff will be damaged in said or 
any sum by compliance with the orders or any order of said 
judgment. To the contrary, plaintiff has been benefited by 
the compliance with said judgment on the part of the defend-
ant, and plaintiff has been and will be benefited by said com-
pliance to an extent greater in fair monetary value than 
the total of all sums which she, Vern on, has been or will be 
required by said judgment to pay." 
This :finding does not purport to deal with the issue of a 
contractual duty owed by Los Angeles to Vernon during the 
period prior to the judgment in the abatement action. There 
is no :finding on the factual question whether Los Angeles 
breached its contractual duty. The :finding that Vernon will 
not be damaged by compliance with the abatement judgment, 
but will instead be benefited, is obviously based on the trial 
court's erroneous conclusion that Los Angeles is excused from 
performing the contract. If Vern on is required to pay for a 
service which Los Angeles is contractually bound to render, 
obviously Vernon will be damaged to the extent of the value 
of the service, which damage was suffered by Vern on as the 
result of the failure of Los Angeles to perform its contractual 
duty by operating its sewage disposal facilities in such a 
manner as to create a public nuisance which necessitated 
the abatement action. It should be noted that Vernon had 
no power to control the manner of operation of the disposal 
fncilities. 
In my opinion Los Angeles should be held to the terms of 
the contract which it made with Vernon. Vern on's con-
tractual right to flow 11.7 cubic feet per second of sewage 
into the Los Angeles sewer system without further payment 
,;hould be upheld. Vernon should have the further right to 
flow an additional 4.3 cubic feet per second of sewage into 
the Los Angeles sewer system, subject to payment of a pro-
portionate share of the sewage disposal cost as provided in 
the contract. Los Angeles should be ordered to return to 
Vernon so much of the payment made by Vern on pursuant 
to the decree in the abatement action as is attributable to 
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the 16 cubic feet per second flow whieh IJOS Angeles is con-
tractually bound to accept. 
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment. 
Traynor, j ., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
5, 1956. MeComb, J., did not participate therein. Bray, J 
pro tern.,* participated therein in place of Shenk, J. Carter, 
J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 23700. In Bank. Dec. 9, 1955.] 
CITY OF OXNAHD, Petitioner, v. E'l'HEL DALE, 
as City Clerk, etc., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Public Securities-Issuance-Mandamus.-Mandamus is an ap-
propriate remedy to compel city officers to sign revenue bonds 
which the city proposes to issue pursuant to the Revenue Bond 
Act of 1941 (Gov. Code, § 54300) if the proposed issue meets 
the requirements of the law, since the acts demanded are 
ministerial duties. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Debt Limitation-Obligations Pay-
able Out of Special Fund.-Generally, a constitutional provi-
sion such as Const., art. XI, § 18, limiting the amount of indebt-
edness which a city or other political subdivision or agency 
may incur, is not violated by revenue bonds or other obliga-
tions which are payable solely from a special fund, provided 
the governmental body is not liable to maintain the special 
fund out of its general funds, or by tax levies, should the 
special fund prove insufilcient. 
[3] !d.-Debt Limitation-Obligations Payable Out of Special 
Fund.-Revenue bonds payable solely from a special fund 
are not considered an indebtedness or liability of the political 
subdivision or agency issuing them within the meaning of the 
debt limitation of Const., art. XI, § 18. 
[1) See Cal.Jur., Public Securities, § 11; Am.Jur., Mandamus, 
§ 162. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 177 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Municipal Corporations, § 468 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1) Public Securities, § 12; [2-10) Mu-
nicipal Corporations, § 174. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
